Discuss and compare how religious beliefs, mythology and ritual were expressed and functioned in the ancient sports of Greece and Japan. (Midterm)

Religion and origin myths have played an important role in the origin of the activities we call today sport. Discuss and compare how religious beliefs, mythology and ritual were expressed and functioned in the ancient sports of Greece and Japan. In other words, describe not only which beliefs were evident in these sporting traditions, but tell us for what purposes did incorporating these beliefs in sport achieve for these two societies?

Name: Hurul Ain Bte Muhammad Reni

Unlike modern sports which lack the definitive relationship to religious beliefs, mythology and rituals, ancient Greek and Japanese sports cannot seem to escape from them. However this association originated, these three features were clearly evident in the ancient sports of Greece and Japan through their origins, venues and ritual practices. By sports, this essay associates the Greeks with the ancient Olympics and the Japanese with sumo (and to a small extent, kemari). In examining how different (or similar) religious beliefs, myths or rituals were expressed in these sports, this essay will thus suggest that their function was unique to each society. In sum, this paper shall argue that by fusing these features in the ancient sports, ancient Greeks and Japanese managed to develop a sense of identity which they took great pride in.

The mythical origins of the ancient Greek Olympics served to remind the ancient Greek society of their own pagan beliefs. According to Tony Perrottet in his book The Naked Olympics, King Iphitos of Elis had first declared the Games in 776 B.C. as a form of submitting to divine instructions from the Delphic Oracle. Once the athletic games begun at Olympia, Greece was relieved from plague and warfare that had wrecked the society before that. The king of gods, Zeus himself enforced the terms of the Olympic Truce which disallowed military attacks, judicial cases and death penalties to be carried out during the Games. In fact, these terms were inscribed on a golden discus that was hung in a sacred place, the Temple of Hera at Olympia. The commencement of the games also had mythical features. A herald announcing the date of the upcoming Games would carry a sacred banner which bore the symbols used by Hermes, the messenger of the gods. In essence, the origins of the Olympic festival were deep in religious and mythical beliefs. For the Greeks, thus, the games were held every four years thereafter as a tribute to Zeus and to propound the ideas of unity and peace for their own society.

Apart from origins, the religious and mythical features were also evident in the venue of the ancient Greek sports. Olympia, the venue for the ancient Olympics, was a religious sanctuary to begin with. According to Perrottet, it was the greatest pilgrimage center of the pagan world with three famous temples dedicated to Zeus, Hera and Rhea. There were also some seventy altars covering the pantheon, memorials and shrines. In fact, when the games were not held in between the four years, Olympia continued to serve as a spiritual center. Thus Nigel Crowther asserts that despite the unfavourable conditions of Olympia, thousands of spectators continued to throng the place during the Games as a form of pilgrimage akin to the modern Hajj. Similarly, the venue for the pentathlon itself had mythical origins. The very spot where athletes competed in this sport was said to be the exact place where Apollo had beaten Hermes in a running race and Ares at boxing. The constant references to Greek pagan beliefs in the space where they held their games thus serve to remind the contestants and spectators alike of the sacredness of the sport. In return, the Greek athletes thus compared themselves to the gods and challenged the limits of human abilities. It would not be exaggerated to hence posit that the sacred venue of the ancient Olympics encouraged ancient Greek men to achieve great records in athletics and physiques that almost surpassed any other society.

On the other hand, the religious and mythical origins of ancient Japanese sports functioned as entertainment and agricultural ritual for ancient Japanese society. Evidence of terra-cotta figures called the haniwa suggested that sumo was performed as part of a Shinto ritual - a view propounded by P.L. Cuyler and Jorg Moller. Indeed, as supported by Allen Guttmann and Lee Thompson in Japanese Sports: A History, sumo was held during festival celebrations at Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines in Japan. The karasu-zumo (crow wrestling) was an example of boys representing the god wrestling against other boys representing the worldly sphere. Similarly, the hitori-zumo (one-man sumo) was part of an agricultural ritual performed as a reenactment of a wrestler’s solitary struggle against the spirit of a rice plant. The spirit would always win so it would bring abundance in crops. Similarly the kemari was performed to bring rain during a drought in 1215 and occasionally thereafter to thwart bad luck. Unlike the Greeks, religion provided a bridge between sport and livelihood for the Japanese as these origins clearly reflected the agricultural nature of Japanese society during that time and their beliefs in Shinto-ism. Yet it was quite similar to the Olympic Games because ancient Japanese sports was also a direct way of paying respects to the gods above so that their lives would in turn be blessed in other aspects besides economics.

Religious beliefs were also deeply entrenched in the rituals practiced in both the ancient Olympics and sumo. During the Olympics, for instance, a sacrificial ritual would be performed. Athletes offered symbolic offerings like ceremonial discuses or animals like goat, lamb or pig to their chosen gods. The idea was to seek favour from the gods in order for them win in the Games. Similarly, on the first day of the Games, each athlete was to take an oath of fair play beneath a ‘towering statue of Zeus Horkios, the God of Oaths’. This made the Olympic Games ‘paragons of virtue’ by promoting fairness in competition. On the other hand, before a sumo bout, salt would be strewn around the sumo ring. This practice, according to Guttmann and Thompson, served as a technique of legitimization ever since sumo was banned by the third Tokugawa shogun for causing public disorder. It is significant to note that this salt-throwing ritual stemmed from Shinto rituals of purification. Thus similar to the ancient Greeks in the ancient Olympics, ancient Japanese incorporated a religious ritual in their sport to seek favour from the deities so that their actions would be sanctified. Perhaps more noteworthy is the observation that religion and belief systems, when entrenched in ritual practices, make these ancient sporting traditions sacred to each society. In turn, the respect garnered from this sacredness is the main reason as to why these sports (and some of their rituals) are still practiced, albeit in varied forms today.

The ancient Olympics and sumo were secular in nature. These rituals had specific and unique functions to each sport but together, they emphasized that each sport was distinct for each society. In the ancient Games, for instance, the practice of applying olive oil to the bodies of athletes was so pivotal that the sacred balm had every role to play in each stage of the workout, according to Perrottet. Indeed, the oil functions as ‘a conservation of the athlete’s body moisture in the heat of the games and also as a tanning lotion’. However, the ritual importance of this was that it separated the Greek athletes from the rest of the society by virtue of their physique. Thus poets in ancient Greece ‘drooled about boys who looked “like finely-wrought bronze statues”’. For the Japanese, however, the bow-twirling ceremony known as the yumitori-shiki was a ritual performed on the last bout of the day. It involved the Tokugawa lenari giving a bow to the best yokozuna and then twirling the bow on the ring. This ritual was added by the Sumo Association to gain support from the shogun, in order to ‘lift the sport out of the vulgar world of entertainment’, according to Cuyler. Hence like the Greek practice of applying oil to their bodies, the bow-twirling ceremony in sumo acted as symbols of making ancient Greek and Japanese society different from others. More specifically, bathing oneself in oil represented masculinity and a taste for the aesthetics for the ancient Greeks while bow-twirling by the best yokozuna embodied the more civilized nature of the sport for the ancient Japanese. These symbols could thus be extrapolated to each society- ancient Greece was a society which valued the aesthetics while ancient Japanese were keen to represent themselves as a civilized society.

In conclusion, it is clear that religious beliefs and mythology were prevalent in the origins, venues and rituals of the Olympic Games and sumo. Through these, the ancient Greeks were eager to assert their values of unity, virtue, masculinity and paganism while the ancient Japanese were affirming their indigenous belief system, agricultural roots and civilized nature. At the same time, however, some of the rituals were less religious and mythical. In the oil and the bow, the ancient Greeks and Japanese had symbols of their distinct identities as a society. Hence even today, the Olympic Games are held every four years as an international competition partly to advocate the original ideas of Greek values. Similarly, the sumo is still practiced today to remind the Japanese of their tradition and culture.

Word count: 1498

Was the defence of Singapore island a “humiliating fiasco” or a “tough fight”?

HY2242/SSA2208
Ports, Forts and Bases: The Military History of Singapore

Name: Joanne Choy Hui Wen

The defence of Singapore island was a humiliating fiasco. In its quick capitulation to the Japanese, the way fighting was conducted chaotically and right up to the mass surrender of one of the biggest British armies in World War Two, it befitted the description of a “humiliating fiasco”. In essence, the battle of Singapore and the defence of it, brought out the fact that not only were they outgeneraled and outfought, Malaya Command crumbled from within to produce an uncoordinated, humiliating fiasco of a fight, if ever so oxymoronic.

Both Lieutenant-General Yamashita, Commander of the 25^th Army and Lieutenant-General Percival, General Officer Commanding Malaya; faced the immense test of leadership. Percival however, was outgeneraled by Yamashita not only because he kept a tight hand on strategic decisions of the field, which hindered an effective fighting battle, he was an uninspiring leader to his men.[1] Warren gives a damning verdict on Percival, recounting the conference Percival gave in January 1942, where he showed no conviction and force in his reassurance of ultimate victory to the Malayan Army, which was embarrassing as well as totally uninspiring.[2] In the first crucial wave of the Japanese attack on the night of 8^th February, Yamashita sent a message to his men ‘Am watching you all from the Sultan’s Tower’.[3] As gleaned from the field trip, with the tower looking across from Johore at the narrow straits, Yamashita’s men, especially his sacrificial first wave, were able to take heart and give it their all. Yamashita exerted a psychological effect on his troops that Percival did not, outgeneraled in the simplest yet most crucial aspect of military leadership.

In more ways than one, the troops fighting to defend Singapore were not outfought by their enemy as much as they gave their own battle away in a fiasco- hopelessly chaotic with a lack of a fighting spirit that wrapped up in headlong retreat.[4] The Japanese were indeed battle-hardened, but they were often able to confuse and break-up a loosely-defined and positioned enemy, who were more apt to retreat than to put up a defensive fight. Right from the very start, the Australian 8^th Division were to stop the Japanese “dead in their tracks” to buy time.[5] Unfortunately, Brigadier Taylor’s troops were already dispersed by dawn of the 9^th February, “the whole of 22^nd Australian Brigade had lost cohesion” and Malaya Command was slow to pick things up because the lines of communication were in chaos.[6] Almost everything started off and continued in a state of perpetual confusion. For the most part, the troops fighting to defend Singapore often lacked the cohesion to withstand the Japanese Kirimomi Sakusen.[7] At the causeway battle, Maxwell’s troops retreated prematurely, exposing a gap in the defense line and ultimately compromising the important Bukit Timah area even before putting up a real fight.[8] Similarly, the ‘charge’ to retake the Jurong Line under Wavell’s instruction was conducted under “such general chaos that no coordinated counter-attack could be launched”.[9] The Japanese did not win over Singapore island as much as “Malaya Command lost it”.[10]

Ever since Ochi and his machine gunners landed at the mangrove in North Western Singapore, the challenge was now to prevent humiliation, but “the defenders instead brought it on themselves”.[11] In retreat after retreat, first to Ama Keng in the Northwest, then Bukit Timah and the final Kranji-Jurong Line, the defenders allowed themselves to be manipulated by the enemy, being pushed inward relentlessly without much forestalling. By splitting up the 5^th and 18^th Divisions down the main thrust into central Singapore, the Japanese potentially compromised their battle in the central area. But the British were unable to exploit that to its fullest.[12] They continued to fall into a headlong retreat into the perimeters of the city itself.

Percival finally signed the surrender document on the 15^th February 1942, one week after the Japanese first landed in the night of the 8^th. The battle of Singapore was described by Churchill infamously as “the worst disaster in British history”. It marked not only the loss of the island, but spelled the loss of empire. It was also one of the largest surrender, the shame of such a humiliating defeat of “Fortress Singapore” haunted Churchill till months after, when he remarked “I cannot get over it”.[13]

Yet perhaps it was the independent actions of senior officers of Malaya Command that made the entire battle to defend Singapore all the more humiliating. It is bad enough that one is already facing a capable enemy, without having to deal with internal sabotage of pre-planned retreats that went against orders or which took place blatantly and illogically. The actions of Brigadiers Taylor, Maxwell, and even Major-General Bennett ensured that Singapore was not going fall in grace. It represented an internal loss of confidence and a disintegrating chain of command that gave “humiliating fiasco” its final stamp.

Brigadier Taylor, charged with the defense of North Western Singapore, instructed his battalion commanders to fall back to Ama Keng and ultimately, prematurely retreat because he believed that it was a needless sacrificial battle he was fighting. It was a swerve from his new mission to advance, and while Percival was left imagining that North Western Singapore was being held by the 22^nd Australian Brigade to the best of its ability.[14]Like Taylor, Maxwell perpetuated a spectacular break in the chain of command by ordering his troops to pull back to Mandai road when they deem fit, which turned out to be sooner than meeting the Japanese headlong. The fight at the Causeway was effectively given up when all was not yet lost. From the field trip, it is evident that Maxwell had a clear advantage in an elevated position overlooking the Causeway. Nishimura was also sending his infantry one battalion at a time, on a piecemeal basis, which was easy target on an open stretch of road.[15] By this time into the battle, the Japanese had already lost a significant number of landing craft and like the British, were having their own difficulties.[16] It was a terrible mistake to not seize battleground opportunities and to exploit the enemy’s weakness. Malaya Command was a broken chain of command-the independent decisions of senior commanders, their feeble, half-hearted attempts at defence, and the deception it forged made it all a humiliating fiasco. It turned out to be pathetic that “The only thing Malaya Command successfully accomplished as an army on Singapore island was to surrender.”[17]

It was expressed that “Chinese and Tamils were friendly and could be relied upon. All Malays should be avoided or shot”, a testimony to the attitude behind the forces defending Singapore who fed on the idea that the local civilian population was not backing them up.[18] Yet it was both the Dalforce and the bloody fight the Malay Regiment put up at Pasir Panjang that mitigated the humiliation of the entire battle. In these two instances, it could be well argued that a tough fight was put up to the point of near annihilation. Dalforce stood no chance against the professional, battle-hardened military men of the Japanese Army driving at them. The Malay regiment itself had to grapple with positional gaps and the neutralization of coastal guns and yet still fought on despite overwhelming circumstances.[19] Pasir Panjang was the one stop that stood out in the field trip because one understood that these were men who were fighting for their homeland, and who carried that cause to its tragic end. It was not a question of necessity, such as Taylor had deliberated over the sacrifice of his men, it was a logical conclusion to that belief.

As the last battle of the Malayan Campaign, the battle of Singapore was a chaotic fiasco that ended in humiliation for the army and the entire British Empire. Malayan Command itself was helmed by an uninspiring figure, with senior commanders who in the end broke their own chain of command. The fight to preserve the island from the advancing Japanese was conducted in a haphazard and chaotic manner, troops were disparate and tended towards dispersal and communication was poor. The liability of Malaya Command and the kind of defensive fight put up on the ground prevented the army from being cohesive, and from fighting a cohesive battle. All of which dictated a defence that ended up in headlong retreat. Yet, it was also shown that the defence of the island was not devoid of any element of a tough fight at all times and by all parties involved. Humiliation though, is compounded by the fact that consideration for this battle will always take place alongside a comparison with the much more formidable Japanese army. It was a humiliating defeat framed by the rapidity of capitulation and the great number of prisoners taken before and on the 15^th February 1942. But it was not so much a defeat as a disaster.

(1391 words)

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[1] Brian Bond, ed., Chief of Staff: The Diaries of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall Volume II: 1940-1944 (London: Archon Books, 1974), p. 76, cited in Raymond Callahan, The Worst Disaster: The Fall of Singapore (London:Associated University Presses Inc, 1977), p. 254.

Pownall records that Percival was “an uninspiring leader and rather gloomy”.

[2] Alan Warren, Singapore 1942: Britain’s Greatest Defeat (London: Talisman, 2002), p. 218

[3] Brian P. Farrell, The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1941-1942 (Gloucestershire: Tempus Publishing Ltd, 2005), p. 340.

[4] Warren, Singapore 1942: Britain’s Greatest Defeat (London: Talisman, 2002) p. 271.

The Japanese could not fathom how such a large army could surrender. Lieutenant-Colonel Tsuji was unimpressed with the defeated Garrison’s lack of fighting spirit, noting that the British soldiers “looked like men who had finished their work by contract”.

[5] Ibid., p. 206.

[6] S. Woodburn Kirby, Singapore: The Chain of Disaster (London: Cassell and Company, 1971), p. 235.

[7] Akasi Yoji, “General Yamashita Tomoyuki: Commander of the Twenty-Fifth Army”, in Sixty Years On: The Fall of Singapore Revisited, ed. Brian P. Farrell and Sandy Hunter (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2003), p. 190.

[8] Farrell, The Defence and Fall of Singapore, p. 347.

[9] Kirby, Singapore: The Chain of Disaster, p. 240.

[10] Farrell, The Defence and Fall of Singapore, p. 341.

[11] Ibid., p. 341.

[12] Henry P. Frei, “The Island Battle: Japanese Soldiers Remember the Conquest of Singapore”, in Sixty Years On, p. 227.

[13] Lord Moran, Churchill: The Struggle for Survival 1940-1965 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), p. 29, cited in Raymond Callahan, The Worst Disaster: The Fall of Singapore (London: Associated University Presses, Inc. 1977), p. 19.

[14] Carl Bridge, “Crisis of Command: Major-General Gordon Bennett and British Military Effectiveness in the Malayan Campaign 1941-1942”, in British and Japanese Military Leadership in the Far Eastern War 1941-1942, ed. Brian Bond and Kyoichi Tachikawa (London and New York: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 72.

[15] Farrell, The Defence and Fall of Singapore, p. 346.

[16] Louis Allen,

[17] Ibid., p. 341.

[18] Ibid., p. 365.

[19] Ibid., p. 372.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bridge, Carl. “Crisis of Command: Major-General Gordon Bennett and British Military Effectiveness in the Malayan Campaign 1941-1942”, pp. 64-74. In British and Japanese Military Leadership in the Far Eastern War 1941-1942. Edited by Brian Bond and Kyoichi Tachikawa. London and New York: Frank Cass, 2004.

Callahan, Raymond. The Worst Disaster: The Fall of Singapore London: Associated University Presses Inc, 1977.

Farrell, Brian. The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1941-1942. Gloucestershire: Tempus Publishing, 2002)

Frei, Henry P. “The Island Battle: Japanese Soldiers Remember the Conquest of Singapore”, pp. 218-239. In Sixty Years On: The Fall of Singapore Revisited. Edited by Brian P. Farrell and Sandy Hunter. Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2003.

Kirby, S. Woodburn. Singapore: The Chain of Disaster. London: Cassell and Company, 1971.

Warren, Alan. Singapore 1942: Britain’s Greatest Defeat. London: Talisman, 2002.

Yoji, Akashi. “General Yamashita Tomoyuki: Commander of the Twenty-Fifth Army”, pp. 185-207. In Sixty Years On: The Fall of Singapore Revisited. Edited by Brian P. Farrell and Sandy Hunter. Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2003.

The Hokkien huiguan, Chinese businessmen and early Chinese education in Singapore, 1840-1965.

HY2239
Molding Young Minds:
The Hokkien huiguan, Chinese businessmen and early Chinese education in Singapore, 1840-1965.

-Tan Yee Lin Amy

Introduction

From the beginnings of migration to Singapore in the early 19^th century, the importance of education within the Chinese community has been recognized. Clans in the early days viewed education as a tool in instilling a sense of vernacular identity, simultaneously consolidating clan control over the attitudes of the youths, and perpetuating traditional Chinese values in society.[1] Subsequently, with the founding of the Republic of China in 1912 and the emergence of the modern school prototype, education was seen as a medium for fostering patriotism for mainland China as well as preserving one’s Chinese cultural identity.[2]

Hence, in view of Singapore’s post-independence educational structure, with the state as the engine behind educational efforts for the whole nation, the success of the Chinese immigrant community in creating their own education infrastructure from scratch in the absence of colonial state support, is indeed noteworthy. The Hokkien community has therefore been chosen as a focal point in this paper not only because of its status as the “major dialect group in Singapore”,[3] but also because the educational infrastructure developed for the community spanned a range of primary and secondary schools, hallmarked by the building of the Nanyang University in 1956. In the absence of colonial support, such was a significant step in educational developments in and for the Chinese community.

This essay thus offers a historical analysis of the role and significance of the Hokkien huiguan to the development of education for the Hokkien community from the huiguan’s founding in 1840, to the formal taking over of educational responsibilities by the state upon independence, 1965. First, the link between the Hokkien huiguan and Chinese businesses will be established. Second, the essay will provide a brief historical background of the establishment of Chinese education for the Hokkien community in Singapore. Third, the role of education within the Hokkien community will be evaluated, simultaneously expounding on the symbiotic relationship between education and the Chinese businessmen. Finally, it is the contention of this essay that the huiguan provided avenues through which Hokkien businessmen worked, in their promotion and development of education for the Hokkien community.

Of Huiguans and Businessmen

Huiguans emerged in the mid 19^th century Singapore as a response to the “basic needs for mutual aid and interest articulation”,[4] which Wickberg argues to be the “core organizations of pre-1945 Chinese communities.”[5] Huiguans were usually native-place or clan specific, and apart from serving as intermediaries, were responsible for promoting economic and social welfare and encouraging cultural maintenance, through the promotion of Chinese education.”[6] The Singapore Hokkien huiguan was founded in 1840 and was one such communal institution.

In the absence of colonial interference in the internal affairs of the Chinese community, individuals with great economic power – the Hokkien merchants – assumed at least 85% of the leadership positions in the Hokkien huiguan.[7] These businessmen-cum-leaders included individuals such as Tan Kah Kee and Tan Lark Sye, who were both ex-Chairmen of the huiguan and hence important community leaders during their respective times. Both men were rubber tycoons, with the former being touted as one of the richest Chinese businessmen in colonial Southeast Asia.[8] Tan Kah Kee and Tan Lark Sye were but the most illustrious two out of a myriad of other Hokkien merchants who held leadership positions in the huiguan.

The significance of the Hokkien businessmen to the huiguan was not limited to the leadership roles which they held. More importantly, by virtue of their economic and social power, were the primary driving forces behind the development of education for the Hokkien community, and the Hokkien huiguan provided the avenue through which they worked. As Liu and Wong note, “Chinese schools (were) sponsored by businessmen through various locality-based voluntary associations (huiguan).”[9] The huiguan not only enabled these different merchants to pool their economic resources in a collective effort towards the promotion of education, but also served to bring the efforts of these merchants to the wider Hokkien community. Despite their lack of high education, wealthy entrepreneurs, such as Tan Kah Kee and Tan Lark Sye perceived their support of education to be a “moral duty”[10], and hence funded the establishment of schools under the banner of the huiguan during their respective periods of leadership. Thus, the Hokkien businessmen were imperative to the survival of the Hokkien huiguan as they formed the huiguan’s strong financial and management backbone, through which they promoted education for their community.

A History of Hokkien Education in Singapore

The Hokkiens in Singapore, like other Chinese immigrants, saw themselves as overseas Chinese nationals – “temporarily abroad rather than permanent emigrants”,[11] and were very much conscious of their ties and affinity with their Chinese motherland. As such, the development of educational institutions in the Chinese and Hokkien community should not be divorced from the political climate of China. Compounded by thee fact that the Hokkien huiguan’s leaders such as Tan Kah Kee were “Chinese patriots”[12], the political climate as well as its emerging educational reforms greatly shaped the way in which Chinese education developed and was subsequently structured within the Hokkien community in Singapore.

The Hokkien huiguan was founded in 1840 by businessman-philanthropist Tan Tock Seng[13], opposite Thian Hock Keng Temple, thus marking the early origins of Chinese education – temple schools[14] – for the Hokkien community in Singapore. Shophouses, residences of sponsors of education, and temples, in particular, acted as makeshift school venues in the early days of Chinese education within the community, and was vernacular in nature.[15] Lim Boon Keng, the first Chinese to be awarded the Queen’s Scholarship, and another early promoters of education amongst the Chinese community received his early education at one such Hokkien clan temple. In 1849, Singapore’s first Chinese private school, Chong Wen Ge, was founded by the Hokkien huiguan under the leadership of Tan Kim Seng, who was also an merchant and educationalist.

In the late 19^th century, late Qing education reforms greatly impacted upon the rise of modern Chinese education within the community, through huiguan leaders who had close relations with the Qing court. Modern Chinese schools were characterized by changes in the structure of the school system and in curricula to include the study of “modern subjects”[16] such as history, geography, mathematics, and physics, and such a system formed the bedrock of the education system within the Hokkien community right up till the founding of the Republic of China in 1912. Dao Nan Primary School, was founded by the Hokkien huiguan during this period of change, and Liu & Wong note that the wealthy Hokkien merchants, through the huiguan, financed “more than 97 percent of its operational budget”.[17] Of this 97 percent, one thousand dollars was donated by Tan Kah Kee towards the establishment of the school.[18] This thus set the benchmark for the active participation of Hokkien merchants in the following promotion of modern Chinese education in the early 20^th century.

Yen argues that “modern Chinese education in British Malaya achieved its most remarkable growth during the Republican period between 1912 and 1941”.[19] “Growth” within this context can be understood at two levels – the progress of modern Chinese education, and the increasing number of modern Chinese schools established by the Hokkien huiguan during this period of time. The dawning of the Republican era in China and the accompanying surge of Chinese nationalism led to the promotion of Mandarin as the medium of instruction and a subsequent weakening of the dialect barrier, argued by scholars to be “an important contribution of the Hokkien community towards modern Chinese education in British Malaya”.[20] With the promotion and institution of Mandarin in schools managed by the Hokkien huiguan, the Hokkien community was able to extend education beyond the realms of the Hokkien community, a significant development in Chinese education and hence the Chinese community within Singapore. Hokkien businessmen-leaders within the community, such as Lim Boon Keng, who had links with the Qing government, were the important links in perpetuating such a ideological and paradigm shift in education, resulting in the adoption of Mandarin as the medium of instruction in Dao Nan School, the flagship of Hokkien education, in 1916. In addition, the Hokkien huiguan intensified its promotion of education during this period of time. This can be attributed to the emerging and changing perceptions of modern education, which was increasingly seen as progressive, in its believed ability to facilitate the achievement of modern statehood. The Republican government during this period also integrated ethnic Chinese education into its education system and thus contributed in supplying educational texts as well as teachers to Hokkien-huiguan-managed schools in Singapore,[21] therefore contributing to the wave of establishment of modern Chinese schools by the Hokkien community. Most importantly, bearing in mind the consciousness of China’s political climate by the Hokkien businessmen in Singapore as well as their sense of affinity with the mainland, the May Fourth Movement in China, 1919, provided further impetus for the promotion of education as education was increasingly perceived as “a means of salvation for China”.[22] Such ideological stimulation led to the founding of two modern Chinese schools by the Hokkien huiguan: Ai Tong School in 1992 and Chong Fu Girls’ School in Singapore in 1915, in which Tan Kah Kee had a hand in financing as well. The development of the latter was significant as it represented an early consciousness of the Hokkien community and its leaders, in the importance of providing education for females, deeming the founding of the school as an “urgent social need”.[23] In addition to these three schools which were financed and controlled by the Hokkien Association during the Republican and post-war periods, Yen also notes that “at least another eight private and public Hokkien schools existed around 1929 in Singapore and they received financial subsidies from the Hokkien (huiguan)”. The Hokkien huiguan later financed the rebuilding of older huiguan-managed schools, and founded two new schools: Kong Hwa School in 1946 and Nan Chiau Girls’ School in the subsequent year. Hence, in light of the abovementioned, the ability of the Hokkien huiguan to extensively finance Chinese education for the community is significant as it indicates a growing consciousness as well as financial support from the Hokkien merchant community with regards to the importance of education.

The establishment of Nanyang University (Nantah) in 1953 by Hokkien huiguan chairman of that time, Tan Lark Sye, and the donation of “500 acres of land in the Jurong area as the site for the university”[24] by the huiguan represented the hallmark of Hokkien educational efforts. Emerging from concerns pertaining to the difficulties the Chinese-educated faced in continuing education in China because of the Communist Revolution in 1949,[25] the significance of the founding of Nantah lay in its attempt to provide the Chinese community not only in Singapore, but in Southeast Asia as well, with regional opportunities of higher education. As such, the efforts of the Hokkien huiguan contributed in unifying the Chinese community in Singapore as well as well as to a certain extent, Southeast Asia. The merchants who contributed to funding the establishment of Nantah spanned a variety of vernacular identities, as Yen notes, donors included “Oei Tiong Ham, the renowned ‘king of sugar’ of Java, Zeng Jiangshui, a wealthy Hokkein merchant of Malacca, and Lim Ngee Soon, a wealthy merchant and a leader of the Teochew community in Singapore.”[26]

The Place of Education within the Hokkien Community

The role of education within the community can be understood at two different levels: the significance of Chinese education provided by the huiguan to the Hokkien immigrants, as well as the significance of Chinese education to the merchants-cum-leaders in the hierarchical rungs of the communal and huiguan strata. Despite the different roles of education within both groups in the Hokkien community, this does not negate the extensive contributions of the Hokkien businessmen-cum-community-leaders to the development of education for the Hokkien and subsequently, Chinese community in Singapore.

Hokkien immigrants

The significance of Chinese education to the Hokkien community in Singapore lay in its attempts to foster a common sense of identity. As Yen notes, “education was a means of strengthening China and the Chinese race”[27]. Strongly influenced by the political climate in China, education emerged as “an expression of ethnic and cultural solidarity”,[28] which in turn reinforced the affinity of the overseas Chinese community in Singapore with China. This heightened a sense of consciousness of one’s identity as an overseas Hokkien migrant, intrinsically tied to affairs of the Chinese motherland.

In addition, education provided an avenue for upward mobility for the Hokkiens within their own, as well as the larger Chinese community. Tan Kah Kee believed that “the promotion of education was the best way of overcoming the ignorance of Chinese merchants”[29], and as such, education was the avenue through which future generations of merchants enhanced their competitiveness within the business realm in hope of better prospects and upward social mobility.

Businessmen-cum-leaders

Most evidently, the significance of businessmen to the development of education is seen through the economic support of the wealthy Hokkien businessmen in the promotion of education through the huiguan. Liu & Wong note, that as leaders of the huiguan, these merchants were able to provide substantial assistance to the affiliated schools because of their “financial resources and popular backing”.[30] The economic power of the Hokkien merchants in early 20^th century Singapore was hence the driving force for the promotion and development of education within the Chinese community. Businessmen like Lee Kong Chian not only donated greatly to the founding of Kong Hwa School and Nan Chaiu Girls’ School in the 1940s, but also set up the foundations, which provided “substantial financial support to local education, particularly to needy students”[31], thus attempting to ensure equal educational opportunities for all Chinese, across social backgrounds. In addition, the establishment of Nanyang University would be virtually impossible had it not been for the donations by the Hokkien huiguan, as well as the extensive economic support by Tan Lark Sye and other Chinese businessmen.

The importance of contributing to the development of local Chinese education by the businessmen-cum-leaders was laden with politically undertones. As Wang Gungwu notes:

“Many…sought security and respectability by giving away large sums of money especially to support and enrich certain aspects of Chinese culture, a particularly attractive form of philanthropy which could win them communal leadership as well as offical recognition and even a modicum of protection.”[32]

This is significant, because it reveals that the support of education could not only have been a gesture of one’s attachment to the community and beliefs in the benefits of education to the Chinese community in Singapore, but it could also be exploited for more self-centered means, such as the consolidation of one’s own personal power.

Nevertheless, one should not fail to recognize the symbiotic relationship between education and the businessmen-patrons of the former. The successful growth and development of Chinese education for the Chinese community in Singapore would have been virtually impossible if not for the philanthropy and support of the wealthy and influential merchants, through their leadership roles in the Hokkien huiguan. In return, the huiguan provided not only avenues for their championing of Chinese education, specifically within the local community, it also provided a networking base for these businessmen to further extend and consolidate their business empires.

Insights: The post 1965 Hokkien huiguan

The process of nation-building from 1959 to 1985 witnessed the regression of the Hokkien huiguan as an important social institution. As Cheng notes, the post-independence government of Singapore assumed much of the traditional roles of the huiguans, of which included the propagation of education[33]. As part of state imperatives, huiguan schools were gradually transformed into government schools by the late 1960s, which Liu & Wong argue to signify the end of “an important phase in the evolution of Chinese education in modern Singapore”.[34] Huiguan schools today such as Ai Tong, Dao Nan and Kong Hwa Schools still do exist, with the Hokkien huiguan contributing to the management of these schools, albeit to a diminished extent as a result of the government’s instatement of these schools as government-aided educational institutions. Hence in order to maintain its relevance within the local community, the Hokkien huiguan has reinvented itself as an social organization contributing towards nation-building[35] - a very post independence ideal – as well as “preserving and promoting Chinese language and culture”[36] amidst the homogenizing forces of globalization.

Conclusion

Despite the changing roles of the Hokkien huiguan over the course of Singapore’s history, the legacy it leaves behind should be acknowledged. In the absence of direct colonial rule over the Chinese community, not only did it serve as an important social institution centered on the welfare of the Hokkien migrant community, its role in pioneering and championing Chinese education for both the Hokkien and the wider overseas Chinese community in Singapore is one which is more noteworthy in the essay’s context. The huiguan provided avenues through which Hokkien businessmen funded and worked to bring education to the Hokkien community. This Chinese education was subsequently extended to the rest of the Chinese population with the establishment of the Republic, and was crucial in instilling an early sense of solidarity and identity within the Chinese migrant community in Singapore. As such, one should not be too quick to brand the huiguan irrelevant to the memory of Chinese Hokkiens and Singaporeans today. The Hokkien huiguan in contemporary Singapore society stands not as an irrelevant article in the history of the nation, but as a past overlooked but not forgotten, waiting to be rediscovered.

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[1] Yen Ching-Hwang, Community and Politics: The Chinese in Colonial Singapore and Malaysia. (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1995), p.52.

[2] Yen Ching-Hwang, “Hokkien Immigrant Society in British Malaya,” in Chinese Migrants Abroad: Cultural, Educational, and Social Dimensions of the Chinese Diaspora, Charney et al. (eds.). (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003), p.135.

[3] Ibid., p.117.

[4] Edgar Wickberg, “Overseas Chinese Organization,” in The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas, Lynn Pan (eds.). (Singapore: Archipelago Press), p.83.

[5] Ibid., p.84.

[6] Singapore Hokkien Huay Kuan, “Our History”, , 2005

[7] Liu Hong & Wong Sin-Kiong, Singapore Chinese Society in Transition: Business, Politics, & Socio-Economic Change, 1945-1965. (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 2004), p.50.

[8] Ibid., p.50.

[9] Ibid., p.87.

[10] Maribeth Erb, “Moulding a Nation: Education in Early Singapore,” in Past Times: A Social History of Singapore, Chan Kwok Bun & Tong Chee Kiong (eds.). (Singapore: Times Editions, 2003), p25.

[11] Wang Gungwu, “Among Non-Chinese,” in The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today, Tu Wei-ming, ed. (California: Stanford University Press), p.127.

[12] Yen, “Hokkien Immigrant Society in British Malaya”, p.132.

[13] Chinese Heritage Editorial Committee, Chinese Heritage. (Singapore: Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations and EPB Publlishers Pte Ltd, 1990), p.3.

[14] Yen, “Hokkien Immigrant Society in British Malaya”, p.130.

[15] Wee Tong Bao, “Chinese Education in Prewar Singapore,” in Chinese Migrants Abroad: Cultural, Educational, and Social Dimensions of the Chinese Diaspora, Charney et al. (eds.). (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003), p.105.

[16] Yen, “Hokkien Immigrant Society in British Malaya”, p.116.

[17] Liu & Wong, “Singapore Chinese Society in Transition”, p.108.

[18] Yen, “Hokkien Immigrant Society in British Malaya”, p.134.

[19] Ibid., p.122.

[20] Ibid., p.130.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid., p.129.

[24] Ibid., p.141.

[25] Erb, “Moulding A Nation”, p.29.

[26] Yen, “Hokkien Immigrant Society in British Malaya”, p.141.

[27] Ibid., p.138.

[28] S. Gopinathan, “Education,” in A History of Singapore, Ernest C. T. Chew & Edwin Lee (eds.). (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991), p272.

[29] Yen, “Hokkien Immigrant Society in British Malaya”, p.138.

[30] Liu & Wong, p.111.

[31] Ibid., p.112.

[32] Wang, p.201.

[33] Cheng Lim Keak, “Chinese Clan Associations in Singapore: Social Change and Continuity,” in Southeast Asian Chinese, Leo Suryadinata (eds.). (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1995), p.74.

[34] Liu & Wong, p. 111.

[35] Singapore Hokkien Huay Kuan, “Our History”, , 2005

[36] Singapore Hokkien Huay Kuan, “About Us”, <>, 2005

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Chan Kwok Bun and Tong Chee Kiong (eds.). Past Times: A Social History of Singapore. Singapore: Times Editions, 2003.

Charney, Michael W. et al. (eds.). Chinese Migrants Abroad: Cultural, Educational, And Social Dimensions of the Chinese Diaspora. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003.

Chew, Ernest C. T. and Lee, Edwin (eds.). A History of Singapore. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Chinese Heritage Editorial Committee. Chinese Heritage. Singapore: Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations and EPB Publishers Pte Ltd, 1990.

Liu Hong and Wong Sin-Kiong (eds.). Singapore Chinese Society in Transition: Business, Politics & Socio-Economic Change, 1945-1965. New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 2004.

Pan, Lynn (eds.). The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas. Singapore: Archipelago Press, 1998.

Suryadinata, Leo (eds.). Southeast Asian Chinese: The Socio-Cultural Dimension. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1995.

Wang Gungwu. Don’t Leave Home: Migration and the Chinese. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003.

Wei-ming, Tu (eds.). The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese. California: Stanford University Press, 1991.

Yen Ching-Hwang. Community and Politics: The Chinese in Colonial Singapore and Malaysia. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1995.

Online Sources

__________. "Singapore Hokkien Huay Kuan” <>. 2005.