Did the Strategic Defence Initiative win the Cold War for the West?

HY2251: From the Wheel to the Web

Name: Lim Tse Siang

Did the Strategic Defence Initiative win the Cold War for the West?

The Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) was a revolutionary form of anti-ballistic missile system using ‘advanced futuristic pieces of technology such as space and ground-based laser weapons, and particle beams’.[1] The purpose of SDI was to form a defensive shield that would protect the United States by intercepting and destroying nuclear missiles at their trajectory above the Earth’s atmosphere, thus rendering the United States impenetrable and safe from a nuclear attack. In his speech to the nation on March 23, 1983, President Ronald Reagan stated explicitly the intentions behind the SDI as ‘a programme to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat’ and make nuclear weapons ‘impotent and obsolete.’[2] In this paper, I will seek to argue that SDI played a crucial role in the ultimate defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War, not through its intended function as an anti-ballistic missile technology, but rather as a political weapon that affected Soviet military doctrines and politics, which accentuated the Soviet economic crisis, finally forcing the Soviet Union to concede defeat and withdraw from the Cold War.

For the purpose of this project, the Cold War will be defined as a global competition for political, social and economic dominance between two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. As such, the United States and the West won the Cold War when Mikhail S. Gorbachev, leader of the Soviet Union addressed the United Nations General Assembly on December 7, 1998 where he announced the unilateral disarmament of Soviet forces around the world, which ‘signalled the end of ideological conflict’[3] and effectively surrendered the Cold War to the only superpower left, the United States.

The immediate impact of SDI was felt by the Soviet military. Prior to the introduction of SDI by the Reagan administration, the policy of deterrence between the two superpowers was dominated by the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD). Together with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty signed in 1972 and two Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT I & II) signed in 1974 and 1979, both superpowers enjoyed a level of parity in terms of military prowess especially in the field of ballistic missiles. That the successful deployment of SDI would undermine the balance of power and jeopardize Soviet military planning is an understatement. As Gary L. Guertner states, ‘soviet doctrine places greater emphasis on war-fighting and damage limitation through large-scale, pre-emptive attacks against military targets.’[4] Although peaceful goals were espoused behind the development of SDI, that of the ‘total elimination of nuclear weapons’[5] and elimination of MAD, negation of offensive nuclear capabilities by such an advanced ABM system would tip the balance of power in favour of the United States in the event of a nuclear war. This jeopardized the Soviet military which had spent millions of dollars in developing various types of ballistic missiles (SS-4, SS-5, SS-20 and SSCX-4). Since the 1960s, the Soviets had already developed and deployed a functional ABM system called the ‘Galosh System’[6] which defended Moscow against nuclear strikes. With the possible introduction of advanced technology in which the Soviet Union had no comparative advantage, such as particle beams, laser technology and space-based weapons through SDI however, the technological divide would potentially widen drastically, thus placing the defence of the United States in a more favourable position than that of the Soviet Union.
In order to counter the threats posed by SDI, the Soviet Union had two courses of actions. They could either strive to limit the development of SDI through diplomatic means such as the Geneva Summit in 1985 between Reagan and Gorbachev or close the technological gap with the United States. Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, Head of the General Staff of the Soviet Union noted that the ‘scientific and technological revolution’ was ‘exerting increasing influence on the evolution of military affairs’.[7] The latter option however would require huge increases in budget to match that spent by the United States on SDI. Reagan in 1988 had commented that the Soviets had over a period of 15 years ‘spent over $200 million’[8] on their defence effort. In comparison, the United States had spent ‘$40 billion research on SDI.’[9] However, the Soviet Union was in no position to fund this technological race as it was suffering from economic stagnation. In an honest analysis of the Soviet economy by the Central Committee of the Communist Party under Yuri V. Andropov, who ‘entrusted the work to Gorbachev’[10], the economy of the Soviet Union was diagnosed to be in a crisis. ‘Economic growth in the Soviet Union had fizzled out’[11]and Soviet military spending increased ‘only 2 percent annually after 1976,’[12] as compared to United States defence spending which would ‘exceed one trillion dollars over four years’[13] from 1981. Gorbachev was well aware of the economic problems that SDI would raise and perceived it as an American plan to exhaust the already declining Soviet economy.[14] Clearly, the Soviet economy could not keep pace with the United States in the Cold War. To introduce SDI into the technological competition would hence exacerbate the financial burden placed upon the Soviet economy.
The diplomatic course of action by the Soviet Union in limiting the development of SDI had met with failure. Reagan had refused to give up SDI in 1986 at the Reykjavik Summit despite Gorbachev’s unprecedented offer to reduce strategic offensive nuclear forces and the total elimination of all Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles (INF) in Europe, dubbed the ‘zero-option,’ in exchange for limitations on the development of SDI.[15] The linkage by Gorbachev of SDI to all of his offers highlights the political importance of SDI and Reagan’s commitment to it left Gorbachev no choice but to accept SDI as a fact and conclude the INF treaty at the Washington Summit in 1987, which implicitly meant that the Soviet Union would no longer seek to compete with the United States over SDI, which eventually translated into the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the Cold War as announced by Gorbachev in his speech to the United Nations in 1988.

Therefore, SDI was pivotal in bringing about the end of the Cold war. Withdrawal from it was necessary before Gorbachev could implement his domestic social, political and economic reforms of ‘Perestroika’ and ‘Glasnost’ which could not be undertaken had the Soviet Union committed to another round of technological arms race over SDI which would have drained the Soviet economy even further.

In conclusion, the SDI saga illustrated the centrality of technology during the Cold War. Economic and military competition between capitalism and communism expedited the rate of technological advancements between the two superpowers at the cost of millions of dollars as the sovereignty and survival of nations become linked with its technological prowess, a hallmark of the world after the second industrial revolution. There appears also to be a gradual shift from previously total wars targeted at civilian populations to the protection of them, as the world rejects the destructiveness of technology characterized by MAD through nuclear wars and embrace the technology in the name of progress, illustrated by the elimination of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and the promotion of SDI as an alternative to a nuclear holocaust.

(1190 words)

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[1] Mira Duric, The Strategic Defence Initiative: US Policy and the Soviet Union (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 4.

[2] Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation on the Strategic Defence Initiative”, in Strategic Defence Initiative: Folly or Future?, ed. P. Edward Haley and Jack Merritt (Colorado: Westview Press, Inc, 1986), p. 24.

[3] Duric, The Strategic Defence Initiative, p. 124.

[4] Gary L. Guertner, “Nuclear War in a Defence-dominant World”, in The Technology, Strategy, and Politics of SDI, ed. Stephen J. Cimbala (Colorado: Westview Press, Inc, 1987), p. 20.

[5] Gary L. Guertner, “Nuclear War in a Defence-dominant World”, p. 17.

[6] Duric, The Strategic Defence Initiative, p. 5.

[7] Daniel Gouré, “The Impact of the SDI on Soviet National Security Policy”, in The Technology, Strategy, and Politics of SDI, ed. Stephen J. Cimbala (Colorado: Westview Press, Inc, 1987), p. 165.

[8] Ibid., p. 16.

[9] Duric, The Strategic Defence Initiative, p. 23.

[10] Vadim Medvedev, “Under Andropov and Gorbachev”, in The Destruction of the Soviet Economic System: An Insider’s History, ed. Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 95.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Walter Lafeber, “The Two-or Three?-Phases of U.S.-Soviet Relations”, in Crisis and Confrontation. Ronald Reagan’s Foreign Policy, ed. Morris H. Morley (New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988), p. 26.

[13] Ibid., p. 13.

[14] Duric, The Strategic Defence Initiative, p. 45.

[15] Ibid, p. 66-88.

Bibliography

Duric, Mira, The Strategic Defence Initiative: US Policy and the Soviet Union. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003.

Gouré, Daniel, “The Impact of the SDI on Soviet National Security Policy”. In The Technology, Strategy, and Politics of SDI, p. 157-188. Edited by Stephen J. Cimbala. Colorado: Westview Press, Inc, 1987.

Guertner, Gary L., “Nuclear War in a Defence-dominant World”. In The Technology, Strategy, and Politics of SDI, p. 13-24. Edited by Stephen J. Cimbala. Colorado: Westview Press, Inc, 1987.

Lafeber, Walter, “The Two-or Three?-Phases of U.S.-Soviet Relations”. In Crisis and Confrontation. Ronald Reagan’s Foreign Policy, p.13-45. Edited by Morris H. Morley. New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988.

Medvedev, Vadim, “Under Andropov and Gorbachev”. In The Destruction of the Soviet Economic System: An Insider’s History, p. 94-96. Edited by Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998.

Reagan, Ronald, “Address to the Nation on the Strategic Defence Initiative”. In Strategic Defence Initiative: Folly or Future?, p. 23 -25. Edited by P. Edward Haley and Jack Merritt. Colorado: Westview Press, Inc, 1986.